Contrary to the common-sense view and positivist aspirations, scientific concepts are often imprecise. Many of these concepts are ambiguous, vague, or have an under-specified meaning. In this paper, I discuss how imprecise concepts promote integration in biology and thus benefit science. Previous discussions of this issue focus on the concepts of molecular gene and evolutionary novelty. The concept of molecular gene helps biologists integrate explanatory practices, while the notion of evolutionary novelty helps them integrate research questions into an interdisciplinary problem (...) New directions in the philosophy of science, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014). In what follows, I compare molecular gene and evolutionary novelty to another imprecise concept, namely biological lineage. This concept promotes two other types of scientific integration: it helps biologists integrate theoretical principles and methodologies into different areas of biology. The concept of biological lineage facilitates these types of integration because it is broad and under-specified in ways that the concepts of molecular gene and evolutionary novelty are not. Hence, I use the concept of biological lineage as a case study to reveal types of integration that have been overlooked by philosophers. This case study also shows that even very imprecise concepts can be beneficial to scientific practice. (shrink)

According to the species-as-individuals thesis(hereafter S-A-I), species are cohesive entities. Barker and Wilson recently pointed out that the type of cohesion exhibited by species is fundamentally different from that of organisms (paradigmatic individuals), suggesting that species are homeostatic property cluster kinds. In this article, I propose a shift in how to approach cohesion in the context of S-A-I: instead of analyzing the different types of cohesion and questioning whether species have them, I focus on the role played by cohesion in (...) the identity of individuals. This shift allows us to recognize why cohesion matters to S-A-I, as well as to reconceive the analogy between species and organisms (paradigmatic individuals), and also allows us to highlight the context sensitivity of both ‘‘cohesion’’ and ‘‘individuals.’’ From this perspective, I identify two problems in Barker and Wilson’s argumentation. Firstly, the authors fail to recognize that species are individuals even if they do not have the same type of cohesion that organisms have. Secondly, their argument relies on a misinterpretation of S-A-I. I conclude that species cohesion is still best framed as a feature of species individuality rather than a feature of species as homeostatic property cluster kinds. The arguments presented here contribute to the re-articulation and reevaluation of S-A-I in the face of contemporary discussions. (shrink)

A proposta do texto é delinear como Heráclito e Platão lidaram com o problema de usar a linguagem para falar do movimento. A perspectiva ontológica de que eles partem é quase oposta. Heráclito vê o mundo como movimento contínuo enquanto, para Platão, o que está em movimento participa, em alguma medida, das Ideias estáticas. É deste ponto de vista que no Teeteto Sócrates encarrega os Heraclitianos de criarem um novo discurso caso queiram falar da sua concepção de mundo. A observação (...) tem um tom crítico, mas não parece estar muito errada se consultarmos os fragmentos do pré-socrático. Em B1 Heráclito declara discorrer segundo a natureza. Utilizando isso como justificativa tomo B67 como um paradigma de como o Efésio repete a ordem do mundo na ordenação dos seus discursos. A primeira palavra, deus, seria o unificador, enquanto os pares de opostos subsequentes citados sem uso de conectivos demonstrariam esta união. Uma vez construída esta concepção retorno ao Teeteto onde Platão oferece outra estratégia de uso da língua para falar do movimento. Ao contrário de Heráclito, ele recorre aos sincategoremas para unir os opostos. Um mobilista deveria falar que algo é 'assim' e 'não assim' mostrando, desta maneira, o estatuto ambíguo das coisas. Como este estatuto não é reconhecido por Platão trata-se de uma crítica à ontologia mobilista. O passo final é ver como Platão usa a linguagem para falar da sua ontologia particular. O discurso usado para se referir às Ideias repete a estratégia de recorrer aos sincategoremas uma vez que a Ideia de algo é dita ser algo 'em si'. A conclusão é que enquanto Heráclito tenta suprimir sua linguagem das palavras que não têm referente além do discurso Platão recorre exatamente a elas para precisar sua referência. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa analisa as motivações de Heidegger para colocar em questão o sentido do ser,conforme seu projeto em _Ser e Tempo_, publicado em 1927, no qual analisa a metafísica tradicional e chega à conclusão de que a história da filosofia se deteve a refletir apenas sobre os entes, esquecendo-se do ser. No §6 de _Ser e Tempo_, Heidegger assume como tarefa a destruição da história da ontologia. Por isto, tece profundas críticas à categorização do ser na _Vorhandenheit_ grega – em (...) Platão e Aristóteles – e desarticula o racionalismo de René Descartes. Para os gregos, o ser consistia em uma essência previamente estabelecida, e caracterizava-se pela universalidade, infinitude e imutabilidade. Em Descartes, com a elaboração da _res cogitans _e _res extensa_, assujeitou-se o _Dasein_ e a dualidade entre sujeito e objeto foi fortificada. Heidegger, por seu turno, objetivou o desenvolvimento de uma filosofia que desarticulasse a metafísica proposta pela tradição (incluindo-se a corrente racionalista), e aludiu que o _Dasein_, isto é, o ente humano, pelo seu caráter ontológico, não possui essência prévia – é um ente existencial – e não é um sujeito dual – pois é um _ser-no-mundo_. Logo, não há, na natureza humana, elementos que caracterizam o ser do ente humano antes da sua existência propriamente dita, porque é apenas na existência e nos horizontes de temporalidade que o _Dasein_ se constitui e se percebe como ente aberto às possibilidades mundanas. A filosofia heideggeriana, neste sentido, pode ser relacionada com a educação, já que os diferentes saberes são construídos coletivamente, na relação ser-com (_mitsein_). Partindo da ontologia de Heidegger, a educação é uma ferramenta que possibilita o direcionamento do ser do estudante à autenticidade existencial. (shrink)

A situação humana no mundo dos aparatos maquínicos e das formas tecnológicas de relação e subsistência exige uma revisão da autocompreensão humanista. A tecnologia moderna estabelece uma ruptura com os modos de vida milenares baseados em artefatos pré-científicos, mas isso não implica uma perda ou destruição da essência natural e menos ainda humana. Pois, a existência humana não é antes poética e depois por acidente técnica; e também não é antes carente e indeterminada e por isso técnica, e muito menos (...) prioritariamente desejo natural e então derrelição tecnológica. O humano instaurou-se poética e tecnologicamente ao conformar o mundo pelo uso de artefatos: o seu ter mundo é sempre um perfazer mundo por meio do artifício. (shrink)

Review on Realist conception of Truth, of the W. P. Alston.

This ar ti cle pre tends to be a the o ret i cal in cur sion into the mag matic world of pas sion con ceived as the un chained power of hu man acts. This pa per is in spired in the works of the Span ish phi los o pher Eugenio Trías, and pro - poses pas sion as a ba sic cat e gory from which to ..

The reappearance of Professor Alasdair MacIntyre's far-ranging and provocative article, ‘Hume on “is” and “ought”’, is the proximate cause of this short excursion to an old, well-scarred, and still fascinating battleground. Re-reading MacIntyre's brilliant offensive thrust led me to review the counter-attacks and diversionary movements that followed its first appearance. They in turn sent me back, inevitably and ultimately, to look again at the cause of this philosophic skirmishing: Section 1 of Part i of Book III of Hume's Treatise of (...) Human Nature, entitled ‘Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason’. The battles of the past have been waged chiefly round the last paragraph of this Section (pp. 469–470 in Selby-Bigge's edition), but my primary concern here is going to be with those ‘reasonings’ that precede the celebrated ‘is-ought’ paragraph. Closer attention to the bulk of Book III, Part i, Section 1, to which ‘reasonings’ Hume says he ‘cannot forbear adding … an observation’ on ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and some selective attention as well to Books I and II of the Treatise, should help to scale down the exaggerated importance attached to the ‘is-ought’ passage. Unless this is done, one runs the risk of permitting a tailpiece to wag the body of the chapter, if not the whole Book ‘Of Morals’. (shrink)

The knockdown argument, the logically impregnable position are rarities in philosophy. Indeed, there are some who might argue that no philosophical argument or position is immune from damaging criticism: what seems utterly convincing to one generation of philosophers is 1iable to be held up as a classic blunder by the next. Nevertheless, Hume's presentation of the problem of evil and his allied criticisms of a Christian-type theism have seemed conclusive to an impressive array of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers, and both (...) his efforts, consequently, might be regarded as likely exceptions to the principle of philosophical fallibility. But now, in a fairly recent article, Professor Nelson Pike has seen fit to challenge even these supposedly reliable cornerstones of our philosophical heritage. More recently still, Pike has included this article, unchanged, in an anthology which he has edited, and he has backed it up with an introductory note which reaffirms his challenge to Hume on evil. (shrink)

This article defends lineage pluralism; the view that biological lineages are not a single, unified type of entity. I analyze aspects of evolutionary theory, phylogenetics, and developmental biology to show that these areas appeal to distinct notions of lineage. I formulate three arguments for lineage pluralism. These arguments undercut the main motivations for lineage monism; the view that biological lineages are a single, unified type of entity. Although this view is rarely made explicit, it is often assumed in philosophy and (...) biology. Hence, this article sheds light on this monistic assumption and shows why lineage pluralism should be adopted instead. (shrink)

Heraclitus uses paradoxical language to present the relationship between opposites in his worldview. This mode of expression has generated much controversy. Some take the paradoxes as evidence of a contradictory identity of opposites (Barnes), while others propose a dynamic union through transformation without identity that avoids the contradiction (Graham). By examining B88 and B62, I seek to identify the stronger and weaker points of such readings. The contradictory identity reading thwarts the transformation between opposites. The dynamic reading offers a plausible (...) alternative. However, it skips a characterization of how Heraclitus conceives of the transformation between opposites in physical terms. To fill this gap, I consider Heraclitus’ use of what I call the anti-cognate internal object in B62. I argue that ‘living the death and dying the life’ is a case of change as mixture, a popular conception among the early Presocratics. Upon closer examination, the anti-cognate internal object suggests that real contradictions belong to Heraclitus conception of change. The details reveal a philosophically compelling view. (shrink)

O artigo problematiza o transumanismo no debate contemporâneo, abrindo caminhos deinvestigação para compreender as complexas linhas da sabedoria transumanista. Busca umacompreensão da condição transumana e dos novos desafios éticos e políticos na era da evolução pordesign intencional. Debate as contradições e possibilidades admiráveis do aperfeiçoamento humano pormeio das sofisticadas técnicas contemporâneas de manipulação e criação de novas formas de vida,inclusive fisiológicas. Assim, pergunta: qual a relação da phronesis transumanista diante da phronesishumanista iluminista? Seria uma superação completa dos ideais humanistas tradicionais? (...) Ou seria umanegação total desses ideais? A tese central é a de que a phronesis transumanista é uma evoluçãocrítica, não sem contradições, dos ideais propostos pelo humanismo renascentista e iluminista, não seconstituindo, portanto, nem como superação nem como oposição a estes ideais. (shrink)

The concept of scaffold is widespread in science and increasingly common in evolutionary biology. While this concept figures in causal explanations, it is not clear what scaffolds are and what role they play in those explanations. Here we present evolutionary scaffolding explanation as a distinct type of explanatory strategy, distinguishing it from other types of evolutionary explanation. By doing so, we clarify the meaning of “scaffold” as a causal concept and its potential contribution to accounts of evolutionary novelty and major (...) transitions. (shrink)

Resenha do livro "Nomes próprios: semântica e ontologia" do prof. Adriano Naves Brito publicado em 2003 pela Editora da Universidade de Brasília, 208p.

Neste livro, o autor estabelece a comparação básica entre as antropologias de Lévi-Strauss e Geertz, consideradas muitas vezes como antagônicas. Indispensável para estudiosos do tema.

O presente artigo discute a crítica de Friedrich Nietzsche ao modo como a noção de história foi utilizada, enquanto um saber objetivo, no âmbito da cultura e da educação na modernidade. O filósofo sustenta que na cultura moderna há um uso desmedido da história, o que constitui um vício que legitima as pseudo-culturas. A educação é, por excelência, o meio propagador da cultura e, segundo Nietzsche, a educação moderna reproduz e legitima um tipo de saber superficial e especializado, que é (...) contrário à vida. No presente artigo elucida-se o conceito de cultura nietzschiano, a fim de compreender as linhas gerais dos apontamentos do filósofo acerca da relação entre história, cultura e educação na modernidade. (shrink)

Kant divide a filosofia moral em duas partes: Ética e Teoria da Justiça. Cada uma é composta de diferentes descrições de deveres e direitos. A Ética contém deveres e direitos internos, voluntários e não-coercitivos. A Teoria da Justiça contém deveres e direitos externos e coercitivos. Os dois tipos de deveres e direitos são definidos em sua relação um com o outro. O que distingue os deveres éticos, ou deveres de virtude, dos deveres jurídicos, é que a compulsão externa para o (...) dever jurídico é moralmente possível, enquanto o dever de virtude é baseado na livre coerção própria. Assim, a finalidade deste artigo é pesquisar a noção de dever, e a relação entre dever, liberdade e coação. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Dever. Liberdade e coação. ABSTRACT Kant divides moral philosophy into two parts: Ethics and the theory of justice. Each is composed of different sets of duties and rights. Ethics contains internal, voluntary, and unenforceable duties and rights. The theory of justice contains external, enforceable, and coercive duties and rights. Both types of duties and rights are defined in relation to each other, and therefore can be understood only in relation to each other. What distinguishes ethical duties or duties of virtue from juridical ones is that external compulsion to a juridical duty is morally possible, whereas a duty of virtue is based on free selfconstraint. So, the main purpose of this article is to research the notion of duty, and the relationship between duty, freedom and coercion. KEY WORDS – Duty. freedom and coercion. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues against those who seem to accept contradictions. He distinguishes between the Sophists, who deny the principle of non-contradiction through arguments, and the Natural Philosophers, whose physical investigations lead to the acceptance of objective contradictions. Heraclitus’ name appears throughout the discussion. Usually, he is associated with the discussion against the Sophists. In this paper, I explore how the discussion with the Natural Philosophers may illuminate both the interpretation of Heraclitus by Aristotle and Heraclitus’ own worldview. To (...) refute the Natural Philosophers, Aristotle proposes a general reconstruction of their reasoning. Roughly, relying on sensory evidence (A1), they see that the same thing changes from one opposite to another (A2). Such a change appears to characterize a generation out of non-being, which a Natural Philosopher does not accept (A3). To solve the problem, despite their different worldviews, Natural Philosophers hint at a state in which opposites co-occur, characterizing an objective contradiction (C). Looking at the discussion in Metaphysics Γ and Heraclitus fragments, sections 1–3 show how assumptions A1, A2, and A3 easily apply to Heraclitus. The case of the conclusion is more challenging. In the case of the Pluralists, the co-existence of opposites characterizes a state in which there is no generation. Such a view does not fit Heraclitus’ mobilism. To argue that Aristotle’s argument is general enough to encompass dynamic views, I examine his problematization of accepting the change of change in Metaphysics K and Physics V. There, after re-stating several points that appear in Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues that accepting the becoming of another becoming leads to a state of contradiction in which the becoming is perishing. Heraclitus’ B8, cited in Nicomachean Ethics, gives evidence that, for Aristotle, Heraclitus puts a process at the origin of an opposite process. Moreover, after examining the expression ‘living the death/dying the life’ in B62, I argue that Heraclitus was aware that his worldview implied a dynamic objective contradiction. Finally, an analysis of elemental changes in B36 proves that accepting objective contradictions does not make Heraclitus’ worldview less attractive. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how idealizations contribute to social activities in science, such as the recruitment of experts to a research project. These contributions have not been explicitly discussed by recent philosophical accounts of scientific idealization. These accounts have focused on how idealizations influence activities like scientific theorization, explanation, and modeling. Other accounts focus on how idealizations influence policy-making and science communication. I expand these accounts by exploring the uses of idealized phylogenetic trees in science. Trees are not only (...) useful for improving our understanding and public communication of evolutionary history, but they also help with the organization of laboratories and collaboration among scientists. Attending to the relation between idealizations and these social practices in science matters. It can help us understand why idealized models become entrenched and why certain social practices change over time. (shrink)

Every philosophical belief has its presuppositions; no philosopher can operate without them. Some of mine are these: that the expression of a thought and the thought expressed are distinguishable but inseparable; that one’s thought about something and one’s feeling about that something are distinguishable but inseparable; that we humans have a nature but that it consists of psycho-physical dispositions, or capacities, of such vaguely defined sorts and limits that, from a spectator’s point of view, I eschew a priori pronouncements about (...) what human beings can or cannot do and await developments, and that, as an agent, I act in the spirit of Sartre’s self-creating chooser. In short, and skipping the refinements—failures of philosophical nerve—a person, a human being, a philosopher is what he does. (shrink)

Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. Non-racist versions of BRR have emerged recently based on sophisticated work in science and philosophy (Hardimon 2003; 2017; Spencer 2012; 2014; 2019a). In this paper, I examine Quayshawn Spencer’s version of BRR and argue that it fails to fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. To do so, I rely on the “science and values” literature and the notions of inductive, (...) epistemic, and ethical risk (Douglas 2000; Douglas 2009; Brown 2015; Biddle and Kukla 2017; Elliot and Richards 2017). Once one realizes the complex relationship between these types of risks and BRR, Spencer’s metaphysical arguments become less appealing than they might first seem. This analysis raises questions about what it means to do metaphysics of race in a socially responsible way. Hence, this paper aims at making these questions visible, inviting metaphysicians of race to directly engage with them. (shrink)

O objetivo é apresentar e discutir algumas propostas de explanação da estrutura predicativa por meio da explicitação da estrutura de papéis temáticos a partir de conceitos semânticos primitivos. A sugestão será a de retomar a teoria dos papéis temáticos para justificar a estrutura predicativa, e assim recuperar a noção de conteúdo semântico estruturado, fundamentando-a no plano pragmático. Para isso, será necessário recusar duas suposições gerais comumente aceitas: que a significatividade das expressões linguísticas baseie-se na conceitualização prévia do mundo, e que (...) a única fonte de conteúdo semântico seja a percepção. A ideia alternativa sugerida será conceber os papéis temáticos como funções discursivas primitivas, nas quais reflete-se não uma conceitualização primitiva do mundo, mas antes a estrutura da situação de interação cooperativa de agentes engajados em atividades comuns. (shrink)